Coalitional Clinch vs. Islamic Order: The Market of Institutions Related to Dispute Resolution in Dagestan
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Varshaver, E., Kruglova, E. (2015). Coalitional Clinch vs. Islamic Order: The Market of Institutions Related to Dispute Resolution in Dagestan. Economic Policy, (3), 89-112. [in Russian]

 

This article describes coexistence of two social orders in modern Dagestan. The appearing Islamic social order opposes well established “coalitional clinch” — the social order that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union. New institutional economics approach is the main analytical tool in the article. On the case of how people choose between institutions of dispute resolution we show that the Islamic institutions being characterized by lower transaction costs and lower level of uncertainty step-by-step replace the corresponding institutions of the “coalitional clinch”. Learning costs are the obstacles for the spread of the Islamic institutions.